Door Kapitein Haddock: Het staat er toch echt in (waartegen zij pogen te beschermen en waarbij - telegraafkop - een 'unhackable' systeem ontstaat):
Austin and his colleagues have demonstrated a DARPA-funded prototype processor that successfully defended against every known variant of control-flow attack, one of hackers’ most dangerous and widely used techniques.
Daarmee houd je (lang) niet alles maar wel veel tegen.
Helaas zitten alle papers achter een paywall, voorlopig.
Een paar hints van wat ze doen achter de hype termen uit
https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/2102883377_Todd_AustinMorpheus: A Vulnerability-Tolerant Secure Architecture Based on Ensembles of Moving Target Defenses with Churn
quote:
"Attacks often succeed by abusing the gap between program and machine-level semantics-- for example, by locating a sensitive pointer, exploiting a bug to overwrite this sensitive data, and hijacking the victim program's execution. In this work, we take secure system design on the offensive by continuously obfuscating information that attackers need but normal programs do not use, such as representation of code and pointers or the exact location of code and data. Our secure hardware architecture, Morpheus, combines two powerful protections: ensembles of moving target defenses and churn. Ensembles of moving target defenses randomize key program values (e.g., relocating pointers and encrypting code and pointers) which forces attackers to extensively probe the system prior to an attack. To ensure attack probes fail, the architecture incorporates churn to transparently re-randomize program values underneath the running system. With frequent churn, systems quickly become impractically difficult to penetrate. We demonstrate Morpheus through a RISC-V-based prototype designed to stop control-flow attacks. Each moving target defense in Morpheus uses hardware support to individually offer more randomness at a lower cost than previous techniques. When ensembled with churn, Morpheus defenses offer strong protection against control-flow attacks, with our security testing and performance studies revealing: i) high-coverage protection for a broad array of control-flow attacks, including protections for advanced attacks and an attack disclosed after the design of Morpheus, and ii) negligible performance impacts (1%) with churn periods up to 50 ms, which our study estimates to be at least 5000x faster than the time necessary to possibly penetrate Morpheus."
Ik _speculeer_ dat het voortbouwt op ASLR (address space layout randomization) , maar dan dynamisch.
Ik twijfel wel over de geclaimde beperkte performance impact - als er data herschreven wordt in het geheugen kan zoiets heel erg merkbaar zijn.
Verder is het nogal gebruikelijk in het academisch klimaat in de VS om nogal grote beloften te doen omtrent de potentie van een researchproject . (oa om sponsors te werven voor het onderzoek).
Hoe goed of hoe slecht dit project is kan ik niet zeggen, maar dat er nog wel eens claims en beloften gedaan worden die uiteindelijk met een heleboel randvoorwaarden alleen in heel specifieke gevallen wat opleveren is niet nieuw.
(zie bv 'VLIW processoren" en hoe goed Itanium uitpakte )